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~f ~• 1. In this case a 3JC uphel':,__ New York's ,:_tatutory excl':!::ill!L d o!_ alien:_ ~ - the _: tate police force. 
f 1~ 2. Facts. New York Executive Law§ 215(3) provides in part: 
J t.,t-e "No person shall be appointed to the New York State police force 
1• +ia r 
1:/P. ,_, .. 
u,k 
unless he shall be a citizen of the United States." This class 
action was brought on behalf of resident aliens denied consideration 
~ 
-2-- -for employment as state troopers. The case was submitted on the 
basis of stipulations and affidavits. 
The 3JC majority held that exclusion of aliens from ~ state -.. ._. ,,,,_., ._. :wa 
·police force was a much narrower disability than the broad civil 
service exclusions struck down in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S . 634, 
and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88. The Sugarman Court 
expressly noted that it was not considering legislation barring 
aliens from "closely defined and limited classes of public employ-
ment." 413 U.S. at 639. The 3JC concluded that the state police 
force was such a limited class and that strict scrutiny of the 
citizenship requirement was not required. See id at 647-49. 
Alternatively, the 3JC held that§ 215(3) withstood strict scrutiny 
because of the state's compelling interest in the loyalty of its 
police force in performing public functions, and because no more <e narrowly drawn requirement would meet this interest. 
The dissent rested on the state's failure to adduce evidence 
that properly selected and trained aliens would make less competent 
state troopers than citizens. The Sugarman exception was regarded 
as only available for a narrow class of high political officials, 
~~ not for policemen who perform essentially ministerial functions. 
_,_ .. J 
p,,~o l(VlJ The dissent noted that aliens serve in the armed forces of the ? 
'h, ... ~ . J.J. 
, .e.tcl>I" JUnited States and that the state police force is a "paramilitary" 
~ ~~ . r~ organization. ~-
~~ 3. Contentions. Appts rely primarily on the 3JC dissent 
and claim that recent lower court decisions have generally struck 
down any form of state discrimination against aliens. Appts have 
also moved for summary reversal. 
• 
• 
-3-- -4. Discussion. The discrimination in this case is more severe 
than that in Nyquist v. Mauclet, No. 76-208, prob. juris. noted, 
97 S.Ct. 307 (Nov. 2, 1976), where an alien could qualify simply 
by applying for citizenship. See also Nyquist v. Norwick, No. 
76-808 (Feb. 18 Conf., List 1, Sheet 1) (exclusion from public 
school teaching). On the other hand, policemen arguably perform 
more of a governmental function than teachers. 
J Court's previous decisions, 
I do not think the result in this case is compelled by the 
The exclusion is narrower than those 
held invalid in Sugarman and Mow Sun Wong. Also distinguishable 
are Examining Board v. Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (engineers), and In re 
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (attorneys), which ~nvolve licensing for 
the private practice of professions. 
I would not hold this case for Mauclet or Norwick, since both <e the nature of the discrimination and its justification are different. 
There is!!£ response. 
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76-839 FOLEY v. CONNELLIE, Superintended of New York State 
Police 
This is an aid-to-memory memorandum. We noted 
jurisdiction to consider the validity of §215(3) of New York 
law providing that: 
No person shall be appointed to the New York State 
Police Force unless he shall be a citizen of the 
United States. 
lv4 
This class action suit, brought by a citizen of 
Ireland admitted as an alien to permanent residence in the 
United States, attacking the validity of this law. The suit 
was certified as a class action, and was decided by a 
three-judge court. A majority of the cour~, in a lengthy 
opinion, sustained §215(3), holding that exclusion of aliens 
was justified by a compelling state interest. Judge Mansfield 
dissented with more than a little vigor, relying upon Sugarman 
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (New York Civil Service Law); In re 
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (Lawyers); and Examining Board v. 
Flores d'Otero, U.S. (Civil Engineers). Judge 
Mansfield certainly would have relied on Nyquist v. Mauclet, 
decided last Term had his opinion been written subsequent to 
that decision. 
As we have been down this road several times since I 
came to the Court, I am quite familiar with the precedents and 
the general principles. It is established that aliens are 




- - 2. 
affecting them must be subjected to heightened scrutiny, and 
supported by a compelling state interest. These principles 
were acknowledged by the three-judge court, but each of our 
prior cases was distinguished on its facts. Reliance also was 
placed upon language in the prior cases (especially in 
Sugarman) indicating that a discrete state statute, directed to 
specific state employment sensitive in character, might well 
meet the compelling state interest test. The majority thought 
that this statute was in this category. 
The majority opinion does make a rather persuasive 
demonstration that New York state police have extensive duties 
for general law enforcement, riot control, and protection of 
the governor, other officials and visiting dignitaries. In 
addition, the opinion found that state police also have an 
affirmative duty to protect the constitutional and civil rights 
of citizens. Moreover, aliens retain allegiance to a foreign 
sovereign: they retain "a claim upon the state of [their] 
citizenship to diplomatic intervention on [their] behalf, 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580: they may be 
conscripted and required to pay taxes by their native country: 
they may not be obligated to fight against their native 
country, or required to take part in any military confrontation 
concerning which that country is neutral. (A34) 
The court below mentioned possible conflicts of 
allegiance that could arise, especially in connection with the 
duty of state policemen to assist federal officers in the 




- - 3. 
police filed an affidavit in which he stated that some 200 
arrests were made the preceding years for violations of federal 
immigration laws. 
The state's compelling interest was identified as its 
right to have policemen, free from possible interference by a 
foreign sovereign, who would support its laws enthusiastically 
and without reservation. (A38). The opinion of Judge Winter 
in Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.Supp. 134 (sustaining exclusion of 
aliens from jury service) was cited for the foregoing 
conclusion. 
Judge Mansfield wrote a strong dissenting opinion 
relying, as would be expected, on the cases cited above - with 
more than a little emphasis on my decision in In re Griffiths. 
But the majority made a rather telling response. It pointed 
out that the dissent's criteria "would eliminate the 
citizenship requirements for jurors, assemblymen, city and 
state officials, FBI agents, congressmen, senators and even the 
President." 
* * * * 
This is another "close call" for me. If the slate 
were clean, I think I would have little difficulty sustaining 
the New York statute. There is certainly a good deal to be 
said for the right of a state to limit its law enforcement 
branch to American citizens. A state should not be required to 
take the risk, however slight, of divided loyalty, 
unwillingness to act in certain situations, the privilege 
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certain other limitations. On the other hand, the rationale of 
prior decisions may be difficult to avoid, as I know from my 
difficulty with Nyquist. 
* * * * 
Note: 
The plaintiff in this suit is a citizen of Ireland. 
Wi&IA-
If he -i-e- a Catholic - judging by what one reads - he would be 
A 
eager to put the Protestants in jail. Conversely, if he were a 
Portestant, the Catholics would have a bad time! 
1/tf,,, L.F.P., Jr. 
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TO: 
FROM: Bob Comfort 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether a --
state can exclude all aliens from its state police force ~ 
consistently with the dictates of the Equal Protection ~"- 'f 
Clause. Your answer depends upon your view of the 
trooper's role in the community, whether you believe him 
to "participate directly in the formulation, execution, or 
review of broad public policy . " Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). As I see the crucial 
question of the case, it is whether the state has a 
compelling interest in filling this particular office with 
its own citizens only. You have indicated in your aid to 
memory that you are familiar with the apposite precedents 
and the arguments in the briefs. Consequently, this memo 
will focus on the central question and the considerations 
pertinent to it. 
I 
My statement of the central question differs a 
bit from that of the court below, but in terms of 
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difference. As the district court saw it, the initial 
question was whether or not heightened scrutiny should 
apply to this alienage classification. The court looked 
to a dictum in Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, declaring that 
equal protection "scrutiny will not be so demanding where 
[the Court deals] with matters resting firmly within a 
State's constitutional prerogatives." Ibid. at 648. 
Finding that the "position of state trooper necessarily 
entails participation in state government to such a degree 
as to overshadow the fact that eligibility for that 
position is a governmental benefit normally available to 
members of the political community.," JS at A23, the 
district court held strict scrutiny inapplicable. (It 
went on to conclude, however, that the statute satisfied 
the demands even of strict scrutiny.) 
Notice, though, that the perspective of the 
Sugarman dictum and the court below is simply another way 
of saying that the state may have a compelling interest in 
filling some positions with citizens only. It makes 
little sense to speak of the issue as one of selecting the 
level of scrutiny, when the predicate for that selection 
is a decision whether the state has a legitimate and 
substantial interest in a citizens-only rule. It seems 
analytically neater to apply heightened scrutiny across 
" ~ 
the board to the admittedly suspect classification and . - -
focus directly on the nature of the state interest. If 
both tests require a showing of compelling interest, why 
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strict scrutiny tier has a second component the Court may 
not wish to impose: the least intrusive means-end 
relationship. In cases finding a compelling interest in 
the discrimination per se, however, there is no separate 
means-end problem. If the exclusion of all aliens is 
itself a compelling goal, then there can be no less 
restrictive alternative. The goal, not being separate 
from the classification itself, entails the means. 
Avoidance of framing the issue in terms of 
selecting the level of scrutiny could have practical 
effects in one set of circumstances. If one examines the 
job under the Sugarman dictum and decides that strict 
scrutiny need not be applied, one must then look to the 
goals served by the ban on aliens. Presumably, these 
would not include the desirability of exclusion per se, 
since that was an independent test for determining the 
level of scrutiny. Instead, one would look to more 
specific concerns, such as preventing conflicts in loyalty 
among members of the Governor's Detail and officers 
serving on immigration cases. If the means-end scrutiny 
then applied to these goals is higher than the "anything 
goes" standard of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961), these individual goals may not be rationally 
related to a wholesale ban of all aliens. For example, 
the state could simply not assign alien officers to the 
Governor's Detail or to immigration cases. Similarly, 
there may be no reason to believe that aliens as a class 
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particular stratum of the people they deal with than 
citizens are. Citizens may hate Jews, blacks, Puerto 
Ricans, Italians, long-hairs, etc.; correspondingly, they 
may favor Irishmen, Poles, whites, etc., yet these 
potential prejudices do not disqualify citizens. 
The point is that by focusing on goals apart from 
the desirability of a citizens-only rule as a political 
statement about a certain state job, one makes it possible 
to reach results contrary to one's conclusion with respect 
to that political statement. 
II 
The central question, then, is whether state <--_ ~.....,...,..-4>-
l
troopers "participate directly in the formulation, 
--::') execution, or review of broad public policy .... " 
Sugarman at 647. This is a very close question. It seems 
clear, as Judge Mansfield's dissent points out, that the 
above language was directed at admininstrative officials, 
members of the government rather than its police force. 
The cited cases all refer to voting, legislation, 
executive officials, and the like. Judge Mansfield 
recognizes this, so the majority's comment that his 
criteria would apply to congressmen and the President is 
unfair. If you wish to restrict the state's compelling 
interest in a citizens-only rule to higher administrative, 
judicial, and legislative officials, it could easily be 
done along Judge Mansfield's lines. 
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They and the state point out that police officers act 
largely in an unsupervised fashion. They establish 
------------.... ---
enforcement priorities by their on-the-spot decisions as 
to whom they will arrest and which offenses are serious 
enough to merit their limited resources. They must often 
decide whether to unleash deadly force. (Note that 
members of the armed forces generally do not 
similar unreviewed discretion.) If you wish 
exercise ~~ 
to hold that 
the state's compelling interest in a citizens-only rule 
extends to the state police, these facts could permit you 
to bring police officers within the spirit of the Sugarman 
language. 
The problem is that the letter of the Sugarman 
opinion focuses on "the r ight to vote or to hold high 
public office." Ibid. at 648. Still, the suggestion that 
the state could establish a citizens-only rule for some 
executive positions is based upon the need "to preserve 
the basic conception of a political community." Ibid. at 
647, quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972). 
I believe that the public perceives police officers as 
political officers in the most elemental sense: they 
decide, fairly or not, who will be subjected to the 
criminal process and who will not; al l the legislator's 
efforts go for nought if the policeman exercises his veto 
in the streets. A persuasive argument can be made for the 
state's compelling interest in seeing these grass-roots 
enforcement decisions made by members of the "political 






- - 6. 
though i t ought to be r estricted to such members just as 
much as formulation of that law. (An analogous -- though 
much more extreme -- example of the public perspective on 
law enforcement is the public revulsion and mistrust which 
usually accompanies the sovereign's use of foreign 
mercenaries to maintain domestic order.) 
Recognition of the unique "political" role played 
by the police officer would al l ow you to aff i rm by 
b r inging him within the Sugarman dictum. There are 
secondary sources supporting this view of the pol i ceman's 
role c i ted in the state's brief. Although I started out 
favoring r eversal, I think I now would vote to affirm on 
that bas i s. 
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CHAMB ERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 17. 1978 
Re: No. 76-839. Foley v. Connelie 
Dear Chief: 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in this one. 
Sincerely. 
---UA · O. r v • 
T . M. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE J OHN PAUL STEVEN S 
-
~ltpUltt.t (!Jlllttt llf f:ltt ~uiftb- ~hdtg 
~rurJrn:ghm. ~- QJ. 20?-'!~ 
January 18, 1978 
Re: 76-839 - Foley v. Connelie 
Dear Chief: 
I shall await Thurgood's dissent. 
Resp;:;:..ly, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
;§u:p-rnn.e <4omt ttf t4.e 'Jtlnru~ .§tw.s 
'JliasfyingLm, ~- QJ. 2.0ffe~~ 
CHAMBER S O F 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE January 19, 1978 
Re: 76-839 Foley v. Connelie 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me . 
• :1: 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
-
CHAMBE R S O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-;§nprtnu Q}ettrl of Urt ~th ;§taug 
jiragltmghm, !l. QJ. Wffe'!~ 
January 24, 1978 
Re: No. 76-839 - Foley v. Connelie 
Dear Chief': 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
• 
Chief: 
Please join me • 




The Chief Justice ... 
lfp/ss 
L -
- cc: The Conference 
). 
- -
~tntt Cltttnrl cf firt~h ~taus 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, JR. 
-.ufri:nghm. ~. ar. 2lJffeJ1, 
February 13, 1978 
RE: No. 76-839 Foley v. Connelie 
Dear Thurgood: 
✓ 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
-'-., 
I , , 
I ' 
~- -; I { / 
I ) ,_.,,. ,_ \.. 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
~upi-tnu ~lllttt oJ tl{t'J.i{nittlt ~bdts-
~rur.q-in.g-hm. ~- ~ 2.Llffe~, 
....... 
March 14, 1978 
Re: 76-839 - Foley v. Connelie 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I have just sent an additional 
dissenting opinion to the printer, I would also 
like to be joined in your dissent. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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~ rutlfinghtn. ~ . (!J. 2llffe~.;l 
March 15, 1978 
RE: No. 76-839 Foley v. Connelie 
Dear John: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
fiJ 
I: 0. ~'t -~J'~ 
1/ 
1 I ·,.· 
l 
~ 
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